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Grain price adjustment asymmetry: the case of cowpea in Ghana  
 
Abstract 
Patterns in price adjustment in response to information are important to market 
practitioners. This study looks at cowpea real wholesale price adjustment patterns in 
Bolgatanga, Wa, Makola and Techiman markets in Ghana. Using Techiman as the central 
market, a threshold autoregressive test for asymmetric price adjustment rejected the null 
hypothesis of symmetric adjustment for only the Bolgatanga-Techiman price series. An 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic regression indicates that wholesalers in 
Bolgatanga market respond differentially to price signals from Techiman than those in the 
other two markets. This suggests that policies targeting cowpea traders must recognize the 
differential responses by wholesalers to information.  
 
Keywords: Africa, Ghana, wholesalers, market information, autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity, threshold autoregressive  
JEL Classification: D82, D432 
 
Grain price adjustment asymmetry: the case of cowpea in Ghana  
 
Introduction 
Market regulators and those involved in marketing are interested in knowing the 
response of local market prices to movement of prices in a central market.  For instance, is 
price volatility the same (symmetric) with upward versus downward movements or is it 
greater or smaller (asymmetric)? If markets are perfectly competitive, prices adjust 
symmetrically. On the other hand, asymmetric price adjustment can result with 
oligopolistic behavior of middlemen, or inventory changes (Maccini, 1978; Blinder, 1982), 
or level of market concentration and interventionist attitude of governments (Scherer & 
Ross, 1990; Roberts, Stockton & Struckmeyer, 1994). Irrespective of the adjustment 
process, theory suggests that at a given level, market price adjustment patterns would be 
similar at various markets because of structural similarities. For example, wholesalers 
throughout a region may react to price changes in the same way and retailers may react in a 
different way.  
Previous price adjustment studies on maize in Ghana (Alderman & Shively, 1996; 
Alderman, 1993; Shively, 1996; Bidane & Shively, 1998; Abdulai, 2000) indicated that 
wholesalers had similar price adjustment patterns throughout the country. Possibly, this is 
because Ghana is self-sufficient in maize production and hence pricing decisions are 
internal. In contrast, Ghana is not self-sufficient in cowpea production and has to import 
mainly from Burkina Faso and Niger, through the informal sector, to satisfy domestic 
demand (Langyintuo, et al., 2003). Initial point of entry is Bolgatanga in the Upper East 
region (Map 1) where wholesalers take delivery of the grains. This means that cowpea 
pricing policies in Burkina Faso and Niger probably have the greatest influence in that 3 
 
region than in any other region. One would expect differences in price adjustments among 
wholesalers or retailers in the Upper East region and those in the rest of the country 
because of differences in their market information management processes.  
This study looks at price adjustment patterns in the cowpea market in Ghana. It is 
hypothesized that at the wholesale level price adjustment patterns are similar throughout 
the country. Threshold autoregressive tests are used to examine this hypothesis. The extent 
to which traders respond to information is examined using autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedastic regression analysis. It is hoped that the results will contribute to the 
growing literature on grain price adjustment patterns in developing economies. 
 
Commodity markets integration and price adjustment processes 
Two commodity markets are said to be spatially integrated if, when trade takes 
place between them, price in the importing market equals price in the exporting market 
plus the transportation and other transfer costs of moving the product between the two 
markets (Tomek & Robinson, 1990). The most widely used approach to assessing the 
short- and long-run integration of commodity markets is cointegration and error correction 
model (Alexander & Wyeth, 1994; Alderman, 1993; Dercon, 1995; Abdulai, 2000; Kuiper 
et al., 2003). The approach measures whether two markets are integrated in the long term 
by assessing whether their prices wander within a fixed band. The usual two-step 
residual-based test, due to Engle and Granger (1987), assumes perfect competition and 
hence symmetric price adjustment. The Engle and Granger relationship that defines the 
relationship between the price in a given local market 
l
t P  and the price in the central 
market
c







t P a P      1 0               …   ( 1 )  
where  t   is a random error term with constant variance that can be contemporaneously 
correlated. If  t  , the marketing margin, is stationary in the test for market integration, then 
long-run market integration can be said to prevail between the series, that is cointegrated 
(Dwyer & Wallace, 1992). Short-run market integration tests, on the other hand, aim to 
establish whether prices in different markets respond immediately to this long-run 
relationship (Alexander & Wyth, 1994). The errors from the above equation are 
differenced and regressed on the lag values as in equation (2) below to obtain  .  
 
t t t       1               …   ( 2 )  
 
where  t   is white noise. Rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration indicates that 
the residuals are stationary with mean zero (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
To account for possible asymmetric adjustments as a result of imperfect 
competition, the model developed by Enders and Granger (1998), which builds on 
equations (1) and (2), can be employed. Enders and Granger (1998) observed that the 
standard procedure to estimate   in (2) serves as an attractor whereby its pull is strictly 
proportional to the absolute value of  t  . The change in  t   is a product of   and  1  t  , 
irrespective of whether  1  t   assumes a positive or negative sign implicitly assuming 
symmetric adjustments. To account for asymmetric adjustments, Enders and Granger 
(1998) therefore let the deviations from the long-run equilibrium in equation (2) behave as 
a Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) process as: 
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               …   ( 4 )  
 
The long-run equilibrium value of the sequence is  0  t   if the system is convergent. If 
1  t   is above its long-run equilibrium value, the adjustment is  1 1  t   , while the adjustment 
is  1 2  t    if  1  t   is below its long-run equilibrium. If the adjustment is symmetric 2 1    , 
thus implying that Engle-Granger approach is a special case of (3) and (4).  
Equation (3) can be modified to include lagged changes in the  t   sequence to 
obtain a pth-order process as: 
 
t t i t t t t t I I                    1 1 2 1 1 ) 1 (           …   ( 5 )  
 
When specified this way, it is possible to use diagnostic checks of the residuals (such as 
the autocorrelogram of the residuals and Ljung-Box tests) and various model selection 
criteria (such as Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) or Bayesian Information Criteria 
(BIC)) to determine the appropriate lag length.  
Rather than state (3) with the Heaviside indicator of (4) which depends on the level 
of  1  t  , an alternative specification that allows the decay to depend on the previous period's 6 
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The choice of (3) and (6) is particularly useful when adjustment is asymmetric to the 
degree that the series exhibits more "momentum" in one direction than the other (Enders 
and Granger, 1998). Such models termed momentum-threshold autoregression (M-TAR) 
models, exhibit little decay for positive values of  1   t   but substantial decay for negative 
values of  1   t   if  2 1    . This implies that increases tend to persist but decreases tend 
to revert quickly toward the attractor. The F-statistics for the null hypothesis using the 
TAR and the M-TAR specifications are known, respectively, as  and 
*  . Their 
distributions are determined by the number of lags in the augmented equation (5), the 
number of variables and the type of deterministic elements included in the cointegrating 
relationship. Appropriate critical values are tabulated in Enders and Granger (1998). 
 
Sources of the data  
Data for the analysis were monthly cowpea wholesale prices between July 1998 
and June 2009 from Techiman, Makola (in Accra), Bolgatanga and Wa markets in the 
Brong Ahafo, Greater Accra , Upper East and Upper West regions of Ghana, respectively 
obtained from the Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Division (PPMED) of the 
Ghana Ministry of Food and Agriculture (PPMED, 2009), deflated by the consumer price 
index (CPI). In Ghana, the Techiman market may be regarded as the national grain market 7 
 
where grains are aggregated and distributed to all parts of the country. Consequently, in 
this study as in previous grain price integration studies in Ghana (Alderman & Shively, 
1996; Alderman, 1993; Shively, 1996; Bidane & Shively, 1998; Abdulai, 2000), the 
Techiman market was used as the central markt.  
Cowpeas are produced mainly in the Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions 
of Ghana sufficient to meet only 42% of the national demand (PPMED, 2009; Langyintuo, 
et al., 2003). Grains are sold to merchants in the Techiman market soon after harvest where 
part is distributed and part stored for resale later in the year to all consuming regions 
(including the producing ones who later become consuming regions). Additional grains are 
imported from Niger and Burkina Faso (Langyintuo, et al., 2003) using Bolgatanga as the 
main import-point market where grains are sometimes re-packaged and then shipped to 
Techiman for distribution. This means that traders in Bolgatanga also depend directly on 
Niger and Burkina Faso for their cowpea supply after the domestic supplies are exhausted.  
Small quantities of grains from Burkina Faso also enter the Ghanaian markets via the Wa 
market. 
Figure 1 shows that the real prices trend exhibit a gradual decline over time. The 
Makola market consistently experienced the highest pieces but no consistency in the 
market showing the lowest prices. It is unclear why prices in Bolgatanga were abnormally 
low between October 2006 to December 2007. 
 
Order of integration of cowpea wholesale price series in Ghana 
A test for unit roots on the data series (Sargan & Bhargava, 1983; Dickey & Fuller, 
1979, 1981) failed to reject the null hypothesis of unit root and test on the residuals 
confirmed that the series are integrated to the order one, I(1) (Table 1). Table 2 shows that 8 
 
the Engle-Granger test rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% level for 
Bolgatanga and Wa, and 5% level for Makola. The implications of the the values of  0   for 
Makola, Bolgatanga and Wa are that the absolute price margins linking the Techiman 
central market and the local markets of Bolgatanga, Wa and Makola are respectively 
¢0.47/kg, ¢0.30/kg and ¢0.56/kg.  
 
Empirical results of cowpea price adjustment  
Following the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration the data were 
tested for asymmetric adjustment using specifications (3), (4), and (6). Estimates of the 
TAR results by equations (3) and (4) are presented in the top portion of Table 3. Various 
lagged forms were estimated but the AIC and BIC both chose one lagged form. Comparing 
the estimated    of 23.10, 14.43 and 14.51 for Techiman-Wa, Techiman-Makola, and 
Tehiman-Bolgatanga respectively, with the critical values of 4.64 and 6.57 at the 5% and 
1% levels, respectively, (Enders and Granger 1998), the null hypothesis of  0 2 1      
can be rejected, confirming that prices are cointegrated. 
The estimated  1   and  2   which give the rate of adjustment in prices towards 
equilibrium given positive and negative deviations, respectively, are -0.27 and -0.43 for the 
Techiman-Wa series. This suggests that approximately 27% of a positive deviation from 
the long-run relationship between the two price series is eliminated within a month while 
for a negative deviation, it is about 43%. Corresponding percentage deviations for the 
Techiman- Makola series are 33% and 59%, respectively. Tests for asymmetric adjustment 
(last column of Table 3) failed to reject the null hypothesis of  2 1     in both pairs 
implying that neither price movement is stickier than the other. The estimates of  1   and 9 
 
2   for the Techiman-Bolgatanga series are -0.15 and -0.41 implying that for a positive 
deviation from the long-run relationship between the two price series, 15% is eliminated 
within a month but for a negative deviation, the adjustment is 45%. The test for 
asymmetric adjustment rejected the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment ( 2 1    ) in 
favor of asymmetric adjustments processes of the Bolgatanga market prices series to 
changes in Techiman market prices series. Positive deviations are stickier than negative 
ones. This means that wholesale traders are more reluctant to reduce prices if they 
experience a positive price shock than to increase prices for a negative price shock.  
The possible reason for these results is the degree of freedom with which merchants 
can manipulate their stocks. Since wholesale traders in Wa and Makola rely mostly on 
Techiman for their cowpea supplies, any price change in Techiman market are transmitted 
instantaneously to Wa and Makola. In contrast, price changes in Techiman are not 
transmitted instantaneously to Bolgatanga market because the latter is an import-point 
market for cowpea from Niger and Burkina Faso meant for the Ghanaian markets. 
Consequently any price changes in Techiman take time to filter to Niger and Burkina Faso 
and back. When price increases in Techiman, traders in Bolgatanga are happy to exploit 
the relatively lower prices in Niger and Burkina Faso until they adjust to the new price 
levels. For a price decrease in Techiman, traders in Bolgatanga have shorter periods of 
adjustment because by the time Niger and Burkina Faso start to experience the decrease, 
Techiman prices would have re-adjusted and so will those in Bolgatanga.  
For the Techiman-Bolgatanga market price series, M-TAR were estimated because 
they followed asymmetric price adjustments. The    values for the M-TAR model 
presented in the second portion of Table 3 reject the null hypothesis that 0 2 1     , 10 
 
similar to the TAR results. The test for symmetric adjustment, that is,  2 1    , however, 
could not be rejected suggesting that the observed asymmetry does not exhibit more 
momentum in one direction than the other.  
 
Price variability at the market level 
An autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic regression (ARCH) model was 
specified and estimated as in equation (1) to test the hypothesis that the local price 
volatility is invariant to price changes. The estimated residuals from (1) were squared and 
regressed on their lagged values and the lagged values of the local and central market 
prices.  A Lagrange multiplier test for ARCH(l) errors failed to reject the null hypothesis 
of homoskedasticity at the 5% level in the variance for all the markets.  
The estimated results presented in Table 4 indicate that with the Wa and Makola  
series, an increase in local market prices reduce local price variability while an increase in 
Techiman market price increases price variability in the local markets. The results suggest 
that when there is an increase in the local market price relative to Techiman (the source), 
traders tend to reduce inventories locally to exploit the higher price in the local markets 
and re-stock from Techiman where price is relatively lower. This thus reduces price 
volatility locally. On the other hand, when price in Techiman increases relative to the local 
price, traders are reluctant to sell grains procured from Techiman at a higher price on the 
local market where the price is lower. They, therefore increase their inventories thus 
triggering higher local prices and hence higher price volatility. 
In contrast, Table 4 indicates that variability in Bolgatanga market price increases 
when previous local market price increases but decreases when previous market price in 
the Techiman market increases. This suggests that when local price increases relative to 11 
 
central market price, traders increase stocks in anticipation for higher prices in subsequent 
markets. When they take delivery of the grains from Niger and Burkina Faso, they are 
reluctant to supply to the Techiman market but rather increase their inventories in 
Bolgatanga. This results in the higher volatility locally. On the other hand, when the 
Techiman market price increases, traders reduce inventories to exploit the higher price 
thereby reducing local price volatility. These results thus confirm the differential response 
to market signals among wholesalers. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
A threshold autoregressive (TAR) model was used to test the hypothesis that at the 
wholesale level in Ghana, cowpea price adjustment patterns are similar throughout the 
country. The model employs monthly cowpea wholesale prices deflated by the CPI 
between July 1998 and June 2009 from Techiman, Makola (in Accra), Bolgatanga and Wa 
markets, respectively. With Techiman as central market, the series were observed to be 
cointegrated.  
The TAR test for asymmetric adjustment failed to reject the null hypothesis of 
symmetric adjustment for the Techiman-Wa and Techiman-Makola series but rejected the 
null hypothesis of equal adjustment for theTechiman-Bolgatanga series in favor of 
asymmetric adjustment.  In the latter case, only 15% of any increase is eliminated within a 
month compared with 41% for a decrease, implying that price increases are stickier than 
decreases. The differential price adjustment between Bolgatanga on one hand and Wa and 
Makola on the other was confirmed by the autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic 
regression model results. Whereas variability in Bolgatanga market prices increase when 12 
 
previous local market prices increase but decrease when previous market price in the 
Techiman (central) market increase, the opposite is true for the other markets.  
The above results failed to support the initial hypothesis that wholesalers respond 
to information similarly. The fact that wholesalers at the import-point market, directly 
involved in the importation and distribution of cowpea, respond differently to information 
compared with all others contradict the symmetric behavior of maize wholesalers observed 
by Abdulai (2000). The relatively greater impacts of foreign grain pricing policies on 
cowpea compared with maize wholesalers might be a factor for these results. This 
asymmetric information from foreign policies is possibly greatest in the import-point 
markets than all other parts of the country, hence the differential response of traders to 
market information. This means that any market policy targeting wholesalers in similar 
informal grain markets must recognize the differential response of wholesalers to 
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*    
-Test 
0
*         0
*      
Bolgatanga -3.0935  3.3471  4.7848 
Wa -2.3096  2.4320  3.0391 
Makola   -2.6513  2.6807  3.5293 
Techiman -3.1251  3.5632  5.2065 
Critical values (10%)  -3.130  4.030  5.340 
Note:   The general form of the equation run was: 
          
n
j t j t j t t P P t P
1 1
*      . Where  1
*     . Reject the null 








t P P       1 0 ;  Techiman P
c  ) (n = 
132) 













































Note: In parenthesis are the t-ratios 
1   AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) is calculated as: n*log(SSR) + 2*k [where n = 
number of observations; SSR = sum of squared residuals; k = number of 
regressors].  
2  BIC (Baysian Information Criterion) BIC is calculated as: n*log(SSR) + k*log(n) 
[where n = number of observations; SSR = sum of squared residuals; k = number of 
regressors].  
3  Critical values of the Engle-Granger test for no cointegration are -3.5 and -3.95 for 
the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 17 
 
Table 3: Results of the symmetric and asymmetric adjustment in cowpea prices  
Market 
1 





2 1     


























































Notes:  Figures in parenthesis in columns 2 and 3 are the t-statistics for the null hypotheses: 
0 1    and  0 2   , but in column  6 they are significant levels for the 
corresponding F statistics of the null hypothesis that the adjustment coefficients are 
equal. 
aSample values for the test statistics of the TAR  and M-TAR are, respectively     
and 
*
  . [Critical values of   are 4.99, 5.98 and 8.21 for the 10, 5 and 1%, 
respectively. Those for 
*
   are respectively 5.43, 6.45 and 8.75; (Enders and 
Siklos, 1998)].  
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Table 4: The ARCH model results 
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Figure 1: Real cowpea price series in selected markets in Ghana 20 
 
 
Map1: Map of Ghana showing locations of study markets 
Locations of study markets 